

Deterrence theory and strategy in the international system from the Cold War to the multipolar era. Towards a new strategy of ‘extended deterrence’ in Greek-Turkish relations

Teoria da dissuasão e estratégia no sistema internacional da Guerra Fria à era multipolar. Rumo a uma nova estratégia de “dissuasão ampliada” nas relações Grécia-Turquia

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Resumo

A dissuasão é o conceito-chave para a compreensão da estratégia e da diplomacia da época (Kenny, 1985). As suas várias versões — ou melhor ainda — as suas principais manifestações surgem durante o período da Guerra Fria (Brodie, Wolfers, Viner e A. Lupovici, 2010), inicialmente por competição, principalmente no campo das descobertas científicas e depois no equilíbrio entre as duas superpotências, os EUA e a União Soviética. Este artigo, usando uma perspetiva histórica e conceptual, analisa a filosofia e a dinâmica da teoria da dissuasão, tanto na dimensão convencional e especialmente na era multipolar. Este artigo revisita o conceito de dissuasão e defende uma teoria de dissuasão mais plausível — a conceção de ‘dissuasão ampliada’. Com base nos *insights* da teoria das RI e dos estudos de segurança, sendo que usaremos as relações entre a Grécia e a Turquia como um estudo de caso dessa abordagem. Esta abordagem apoia a implementação da dissuasão alargada pelo enriquecimento do artigo 5º da NATO. As conclusões deste estudo podem ajudar os membros da comunidade académica a familiarizarem-se com este novo conceito de dissuasão.

Palavras-chave: dissuasão, teoria estratégica, doutrina, teoria das RI, armas nucleares

Abstract

Deterrence is the key concept for understanding the strategy and diplomacy of the age (Kenny, 1985). Its various versions — or better yet — its main manifestations appear during the Cold War period (Brodie, Wolfers, Viner, at A. Lupovici, 2010), initially through competition, especially in the field of scientific discoveries and then in the balance between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. This article, using a historical and conceptual perspective, analyses the philosophy and dynamic of the deterrence theory, both in the conventional and especially in its Cold War and the multipolar era dimension. This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defends a more plausible deterrence theory — the ‘extended deterrence’ conception. Drawing on insights from the IR theory and security studies, we are going to use Greek-Turkish relations as a case study of this approach. This approach supports an implementation of the extended deterrence by the enrichment of the NATO’s article 5. The findings of this study can help members of the academic community familiarize themselves with this new concept of deterrence.

Keywords: deterrence, strategic theory, doctrine, IR theory, nuclear weapons.

1. Introduction

Dealing with the fundamental essence of this approach, deterrence is a well-defined concept that has been studied and practiced throughout history and, to an even greater depth, following the advent of nuclear weapons (Schwarz, 2005). The present challenge refers to the transition from the classical-conventional to nuclear deterrence and to new forms of this doctrine. This paper seeks to draw out the literature on deterrence and identify its applicability within a newly delineated domain of analysis. Classical deterrence centers on a potential adversary’s cost-benefit calculus to dissuade specific actions, and differs from compellence by focusing on *ex-ante* behavior manipulation through *a priori* use of force or other tools of state power. Both compellence (as Thomas C. Schelling quoted), and deterrence are forms of coercion, however, the former employs both hard and soft power (in terms of J. Nye’s approach) both in the present and future with continued or escalated actions, while the latter threatens use of force (power) absent their employment (Schwarz, 2005).

It is well-known that the strategy of deterrence seems to have become problematic since the downfall of the Soviet Union. ‘Some even maintain that the US has abandoned the strategy altogether. The concept of deterrence is also no longer found in discussions about European security policy, having been replaced by the idea of conflict prevention, preferably employing non-military means.’^[1] Under this direction there is no getting around the fact that violence can often only be avoided or ended

1. Schwartz K. D., “The Future of Deterrence”, *SWP Research Paper*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (2005), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/Microsoft_Word___S13_05_swz_engl_ks.pdf, pp. 1-36.

by the threat or occasional use of counterforce. Success at containing and moderating violent conflicts, or, for that matter, resolving and ending them, is dependent on using instruments that are appropriate to and correspond with phases of a conflict. This is the inevitable conclusion one reaches after an analysis of post-Cold War conflicts, leading to a number of consequences for the shaping of international and national policy as well as for deterrence (Schwarz, 2005).

For this reason, this paper examines Schwarz's idea that any reevaluation of the deterrence's concepts has to begin with the realization that the reduction (reflection) of the term and its substance to military, and particularly nuclear means is outdated. Furthermore, deterrence will no longer play the role it had during the bipolar and nuclear world of the East-West conflict with its clear and calculate threats, due to the new multipolar type of the world order. Along this path, the following research proposal revisits the concept of deterrence as 'extended deterrence' and seeks its implementation in Greek-Turkish relations in which it is necessary to enrich NATO's article 5.

Methodologically, this paper combines analytical tools from the fields of international history, security studies and IR theory, with a more reflective point of view. Initially, an analysis of the predominant term is attempted in close connection with the strategic theory. It presents the contemporary problem, as it results from the study of literature on the deterrence issues. In order for the objectives of the study to be met, a wide range of historic data sources were used in the research. The sources of primary and secondary data (literature, internet) are referenced in the discussion. The main contribution is a detailed case-study of deterrence in Greek-Turkish relations. Empirical detection and demonstration are supplying the analysis with the required gravity. The study concludes with a discussion on recommendations and other food for thought.

2. The history of the deterrence

Historically the deterrence is not a novel concept. The classical IR rule on deterrence can be traced back to the Peloponnesian War and the threat of violence in response to the adversary actions. Consequently, Machiavelli holds a unique position in strategic-military thinking, due to the fact that his ideas were based on the acknowledgment of the relationship between the changes in military organization and on the revolutionary changes that had occurred in the social, political and technological sector (P. Paret, 2004). What is more, Machiavelli argues that the aim of any military operation — which must be planned in advance and be coordinated — is the one decisive battle and therefore administration should be a one-man show. As regards Clausewitz, the concept of strategy, according to his definition, includes the use or threat of use of the battle for war purposes. Verbatim: 'strategy is the use of armed force to achieve the military objective and thus the political purpose of war'.

Yet, more modern formulations of deterrence are largely rooted in the nuclear world following World War. The most common type of deterrence known as conven-

tional deterrence was established by Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling and others and focuses on the *ex-ante* dissuasion of adversaries through the threat of *ex-post* costs in response to potential adversary actions. Robert Jervis identified three ‘waves’ of deterrence theorizing to which a potential fourth wave has been added by Jeffery Knopf. First wave deterrence theory rested on the rise and consequences of nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie et al., asserted that the use of nuclear weapons had almost no innate strategic or tactical value outside of being a threat against an adversary. In this context, in modern times, the transition to nuclear weapons has changed the concept of strategy dramatically and has caused structural changes in international relations, while the study of nuclear strategy is the study of the non-use of these weapons. In strategic dilemmas, the answers were given in the form of strategic doctrines. In particular, they were being transmuted, among other things, in the strategic deterrence doctrine, pointing out that for a long time the center of analytical gravity has focused on the relevant American point of view; until recently the Soviet point of view was absent. Observing the corresponding strategic doctrines, we have seen, in the spirit of containment, ‘nuclear deterrence’, as an *ex natura* defense strategy. However, technological progress and the changing balance of power between the US and the USSR had consequently transformed the deterrence doctrine by which the US intended to prevent Soviet aggression in the future. Beyond that, the US relied on the *quid pro quo* ability, with instruments chosen by the United States through the policy of ‘massive retaliation’. Its interpretation reflected that the nuclear response to a major USSR attack would be so damaging that it would cancel out the potential gain of the attack. Therefore, the US defense strategy had been based on increased spending, on the US nuclear program, but at the same time conventional allied forces were reinforced in order to ensure absolute military readiness whenever and wherever a Soviet attack was to take place.^[2] Cold War deterrence^[3] was based precisely on the existence of a huge number of destructive weapons and on the guarding of many strategic nuclear weapons, as well as on unilateral efforts for international stability^[4]. Brinkmanship

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2. Also, both the idea of a ‘pre-emptive attack’ and ‘vulnerability’ (regarding to the ‘first’ and ‘second strike’) were important.
 3. Glenn Snyder, a member of the original postwar generation of deterrence theorists, recognized as early as 1959 that U.S. forces were “incapable of denying any territory to the Soviets that they wish to take with full force.” That was not the forces’ main purpose—but nor, on the other hand, were they mere “hostages,” a force serving only as a trip wire for U.S. involvement. The sizeable U.S. presence had deterrent value “in its indirect complementary effects—that is, in the extent to which it strengthens the probable or evident willingness of the West to activate the strategic airpower deterrent.” (See: Mazarr, 2018).
 4. Mazarr M. J, “Understanding Deterrence”, *RAND Corporation* (2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf, pp.1-14: For obvious reasons, extended deterrence is more challenging than direct deterrence. This is partly true for military operational reasons: It is more difficult to deny an attack far from home, a mission that demands the projection of military force sometimes thousands of miles away and often much closer to the territory of the aggressor state. However, it is also true for reasons of credibility. An aggressor can almost always be certain a state will fight to defend itself, but it may doubt that a defender will fulfill a pledge to defend a third party. During the Cold War, for example, there were constant debates about the credibility of the U.S. promise to “sacrifice New York for Paris.”

and its dynamics explained not only Cold War crises, but also what has been done in the political reciprocation that followed the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Powell, 2003). Following this path, that is, of the US nuclear prominence (as a result of the use of atomic bombs), we saw the political and ideological representations of the opponent, the promotion of containment policy and the consequent nuclear deterrence as the ultimate means of its implementation, which also had an economic aspect: the cost was prohibitive for Western Europe as *vis a vis* conventional weapons (Ifantis, 2010, p.234). Thus, it is important for the evolution of the deterrence doctrine to focus on the Cuban missile crisis (1962)^[5]. By that time, the deterrence doctrine was that of massive retaliation, as the US would respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by the Soviets against Western Europe. The technological developments and the Soviet achievements, with the USSR's ability to attack US territory endangered the deterrence structure of the United States. Also, the Cuban missile crisis and the possibility of a potential first strike (as Castro and Guevara desired) by the USSR leadership have shown that rationalism (and not unorthodox action) is (the) key to deterrence. Furthermore, the strategic theory debate focuses on the contradiction of the following dipoles, such as 'action-reaction' and 'defense-attack'. The fundamental concept to adopt a nuclear strategy was escalation-supposing, of course, that one might have warned the opponent that things could, at some point, get out of control. Nevertheless, the idea of superiority in escalation was much more attractive than the threat of leaving something to chance. It is important to say that, during the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy repudiated the Soviet Union's choice of retaliation by dispersing all US aircrafts at political airports and by threatening a total retaliation. Finally, the adoption of the US 'flexible response' strategic doctrine led to a greater flexibility in choosing the means of conflict through a more systematic classification of weapons systems that would be used in a conflict to the point of 'nucleariarity' (at conventional-tactic, nuclear-Strategic nuclear weapons level). In fact, it had caused a terrifying military power expansion (of the two superpowers) horizontally (by upgrading and proliferating the existing weapons) and vertically (by creating new weapons). Following Kennedy's assassination, under MacNamara's leadership, we evidenced the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine. Its content derived from the ability of prevention versus a deliberate nuclear attack against the United States or its allies; by continually maintaining a clear and unsure ability to inflict on the attacker or on the coalition of attackers an unacceptable degree of harm - even after the absorption of a sudden first attack. 'This doctrine argued that, due to the very large number of nuclear weapons which were available to both sides meaning that a mutual disaster

5. Mazarr, op.cit: in many Cold War cases, for example, such as Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. leaders ended up undertaking various initiatives to convince the Soviet Union that it would be secure without aggression. Especially when dealing with a peer rival that believes it has a rightful claim to international status, it can be very difficult to merely threaten a potential aggressor into submission. Some form of reassurance is almost always part of any successful dissuasion strategy.

was fairly certain, a broader political balance was feasible' (Ifantis, 2010, *ibid.*, p. 238). Subsequently, during the Nixon administration, the US revised its flexible response doctrine, by emphasizing not the principle of superiority, in terms of nuclear strategy, but the sufficiency of nuclear forces to meet specific goals without wasting fire. In addition to those assumptions, and under the weight of the political events that followed, the Vietnam case was an attempt for settlement between the two powerful international actors. Hence, we saw a mutual restriction of strategic nuclear weapons (SALT-Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty). We should also mention President Reagan's brilliant initiative (1983), through the development of an anti-ballistic defense national system (the establishment of space anti-ballistic systems, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)), also known as 'Star Wars'. This initiative was a powerful bargaining chip against the USSR, despite the fact that many experts expressed their objections to its technological potential. For this reason, the Reagan-Gorbachev aim talks (1986) led to limiting nuclear arsenals in.

In this historical perspective, the nature of deterrence in the post-Cold War period seems to be changing or, like threats, no longer involving the traditional ones but those from new, weak, unstable states, and non-state actors. This new situation raises a new view of changing the *status quo* for the US strategy; of changing regimes that are factors of instability for international security. This reality derives from the assumption that traditional sanctions or threats inside the international community do not seem to have the results seen in earlier historical periods. However, the proliferation and the possession of nuclear weapons by states and regimes that cause instability seem to create second thoughts on the US plans to overturn these regimes (Powell R., 2003). However, due to the fact that these rogue states and regimes are too dangerous for the US interests (McDounough 2006) and considering that they have weapons of mass destruction, we can see the corresponding dangerous image for US strategic vision and management. Mainly due to the technology sector changes (Fortmann-Von Hlatky 2009, cited Ed Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009), especially in weapons systems (for example intercontinental ballistic missiles) (McDounough 2006), biological weapons (cited Paul, Morgan, Wirtz 2009), cyber-attacks, brought about similar shifts to the conventional deterrence doctrine. These asymmetric threats and vulnerability (see 9/11) contributed to redefining or revising the deterrent strategy issues. In light of these, we see a new kind of collective deterrence action that passes through the prism or kaleidoscope of the Western states' political aspirations (Morgan 2012, p. 91).

3. Conceptualizing the essence and promoting the importance of using the extended deterrence

Deterrence is the military strategy under which one power uses the threat of reprisal effectively to preclude an attack from an adversary power. Thus, nuclear-deterrence strategy relies on two basic conditions: the ability to retaliate after a surprise attack must be perceived as credible; and the will to retaliate must be perceived as a possi-

bility, though not necessarily as a certainty (Brittanica). Moreover, deterrence is the practice of discouraging or restraining someone — in world politics, usually a nation-state — from taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack. It involves an effort to stop or prevent an action, as opposed to the closely related but distinct concept of “compellence,” which is an effort to force an actor to do something (Mazarr, 2018).

The classic literature distinguishes between two fundamental approaches to deterrence.

- Deterrence by denial strategies seek to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives — deploying sufficient local military forces to defeat an invasion, for example.
- Deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, threatens severe penalties, such as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions, if an attack occurs. These penalties are connected to the local fight and the wider world. The focus of deterrence by punishment is not the direct defense of the contested commitment but rather threats of wider punishment that would raise the cost of an attack (Mazarr, 2018).

Deterrence can be used in two sets of circumstances. Direct deterrence consists of efforts by a state to prevent attacks on its own territory — in the U.S. case, within the territorial boundaries of the United States itself. During the Cold War, direct deterrence involved discouraging a Soviet nuclear attack on U.S. territory (Mazarr, 2018). Finally, the theoretical literature distinguishes between two overlapping time periods in which deterrence policies can be employed.

- General deterrence is the ongoing, persistent effort to prevent unwanted actions over the long term and in non-crisis situations.
- Immediate deterrence represents more short-term, urgent attempts to prevent a specific, imminent attack, most typically during a crisis.

Mazarr specially quoted that it is important to understand the idea of discouraging unwanted actions as including means beyond threats — to think of deterrence as only one part of a larger process of dissuading an actor. The goal of dissuasion is to convince a potential attacker that the cost-benefit calculus of aggression is unfavorable, partly through emphasizing the costs of aggression but also through offering reassurances and benefits that make a world without aggression more attractive. It is an approach designed to make aggression as unnecessary as it is costly. “In its most general form,” Alexander George and Richard Smoke have written, “deterrence is simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.” This concept suggests that deterrent strategies can help prevent an action by including steps to make an action unnecessary — including offering concessions or reassurances. Alexander George and Richard Smoke identify three attributes important for signaling in conventional deter-

rence: “(1) the full formulation of one’s intent to protect a nation; (2) the acquisition and deployment of capacities to back up that intent; (3) the communication of intent to a potential aggressor” (Mazarr, 2018).⁶

Conceptual pluralism as to the essence of deterrence is a common ground. Many times, we see that there is a proximity to other concepts, while the individual categorizations are characterized by epistemological requisitions, depending on the analyst’s cognitive starting point and discipline. We are observing theoretical, methodological and empirical difficulties. It is, however, important to separate the concept of deterrence from the variety of strategies related to deterrence (Knopf, 2009 cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009). Therefore, at a cognitive level, if we try to define the essence of deterrence (which is very nice in its simplicity (Stein, 2009 cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009), we can say that it is a kind of preventive influence, which primarily derives from negative motivations. As a deliberate strategy, deterrence intends to prevent the action of the other party. This separates the meaning of deterrence from the other pressing strategy of coercion; coercion aims to make the other party change its action, to prevent or to revise the undertaken task. However, it is not always easy to clarify whether the purpose of action is related either to deterrence or to coercion; and political action is relevant (Knopf, 2009, p. 37 cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009). But it is (analytically) important to say that deterrence is a kind of influence because it works by influencing the actor’s decision-making system, particularly the opponent’s point of view. And this context is also relevant to psychological-neurological parameters and to the strategic and political culture (Stein, 2009, cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009).

In strategic theory, balance of power and lack of inequalities are the theoretical basis of the classical deterrence theory, which has its extension and implementation in the nuclear age. In particular (in order to succeed), classical, conventional and nuclear deterrence theories are based on three dimensions according to which:

- the deterrent actor has his own sufficient capacity,
- the deterrent’s threat is credible and valid,
- the deterrent is able to communicate his threat to the opponent (Paul, Morgan and Wirtz, 2009).

6. Deterrence is more than simply threatening punishment. Deterrence requires substantial target relevant costs and the development of mechanisms to establish that further costs are credibly wagered to provide clarity for an adversary. The goal of this clarity is to establish within an adversary’s calculus that their expected gains are less than any potential losses incurred. Reassessments of rational modeling and the increasing importance of cognitive modeling increase the value of tailored deterrence strategies predicated on the uniqueness of conditions and actors. Paul notes that deterrence is complex and is most logically broken down into five ideal types: (1) “deterrence among great powers; (2) deterrence among new nuclear states; (3) deterrence and extended deterrence involving great powers and regional powers armed with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; (4) deterrence between nuclear states and non-state actors (5) deterrence by collective actors” (Mazarr, *ibid*).

Subsequently, one may distinguish different levels of classical nuclear deterrence: the structural (neorealist) deterrence theory (Kaplan 1957, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 1990). As for the former, it is assumed that the key to international stability lies in the distribution of power within the system. According to this assumption, the state's equilibrium, combined with the enormous cost of a nuclear war, makes any possibility of war prohibitive. The latter point of view is based on the decision theoretic deterrence theory focusing on the interaction between the results, choices and preferences; these factors are determining interstate conflict behavior, which is based on the game theory filtering. In addition to this and according to the devotees of this approach, we are in a position to remove many of the antinomies of structural or neo-realistic deterrence theory. Hence, these decision models are demonstrating the optimal strategic behavior in a world governed or interpreted by structural deterrence theory. The claim of these decision models (where strategic uncertainty, subjectivity of perceptions and rational conception are fundamental factors) reflect Kissinger's view, according to which the capacity to govern (as an art of politics) lies in the calculation of risks and rewards (this calculation has its own impact on the opponent's calculations).

Speaking of today's complicated or complex deterrence, we assume the following deductions:

- Deterrence among great powers,
- Deterrence among new nuclear powers,
- Deterrence and extended deterrence which involve nuclear great powers and regional forces equipped with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons,
- Deterrence among nuclear states and non-state actors,
- Deterrence through 'Preventing Collective Action' (Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009).

Deterrence has two types of distinction:

- 'Counter-value deterrence' through the threat of retaliation (against non-military objectives).
- 'Counter-force deterrence' through the threat of retaliation (against military objectives) (Zagare and Kilgour 2000).

"The twin challenges posed by suicide terrorism (9/11) and the U.S. embrace of preemption prompt many scholars to reexamine deterrence, leading to an outpouring of studies seeking to assess that strategy's potential against the "asymmetric" threats that have dominated U.S. concerns in the early years of the twenty-first century".^[7] For this reason, we are talking about complex deterrence (Paul, Morgan and

7. Knopf, Jeffrey W, "Three Items in One: Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and Political Issue". *Complex Deterrence*, edited by T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz, Chicago: University

Wirtz 2009) as a backdrop of the international environment (post 9/11); (Knopf, 2009 cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009). In particular, the US aspiration to ‘nuclear superiority’ is being questioned. The reason for this is that the new strategic environment is full of features that make it uncertain (McDounough 2006). Fundamentally, due to terrorism, we are dealing with a new reality that raises new stakes and levels of action for deterrence theory, especially the question about the US possibility of a first strike. Particularly, through the prism of constructivism it becomes clear that the defense capabilities of a deterrent actor have many limitations, since the value system of a terrorist is different and incompatible with the rationale that lies on behind the deterrence doctrine. Thus, we have to search for new trends of deterrence in order to address the terrorist threats (Lupovici 2010), in the asymmetric-warfare era (Stein, 2009 cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009). The possibility of a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons is a visible and serious danger, and hence the need for the retaliation (Capur, 2009, cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009).

In this conceptual perspective, to go one step further, reflection in state’s decision-making is imperative, due to the possibility of a new Cold War (Morgan 2012). However, the difficult challenge for states is to reconstruct international order in today’s environment, since they inherently pursue self-interests above all else (Kissinger, 2014). At this point, we will demonstrate the contemporary interpretive attempts or suggestions, according to the constructivist approach, where realism and nuclear deterrence (Lupovici 2010) do co-exist. Hence, we must place emphasis on the social context which defines the ideas of deterrence and actors’ behavior. Deterrence must be seen as a social construct; and in this light it must be seen as a strategy through a learning process for states’ political and strategic culture. In IR and security studies theory, constructivism — contrary to the realist position that regards national interests as “objects that have merely to be observed or discovered,” — conceptualizes the national interests as “social constructions,” which are “created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world, particularly the international system and the place of the state in it, is understood.”^[8] Furthermore, insecurity is produced and reproduced in a mutually constitutive process (Hoyoon Jung, 2019) and for this reason it is crucial for (small) states to reinvent their strategic doctrine and to devise out of the box approaches.

Conceptually and as a learning process, ‘extended deterrence’ involves discouraging attacks on third parties, such as allies or partners. Historically, during the Cold War, direct deterrence involved discouraging a Soviet nuclear attack on U.S

of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 31-57, <https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226650043-004>

8. Hoyoon Jung, “The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present” (2019), SAGE Literature Review – Original Research, Open January-March: 2019 DOI: 10.1177/2158244019832703journals.sagepub.com/home/sgo, pp.1-10. According to him, “constructivist approaches, since its emergence, have hugely contributed to the development of the study of IRs, providing novel insights and distinct ways of understanding of social and international reality with its own added value, by focusing on the role of ideas, identity, and norms in shaping state preferences and world politics”.

territory; on the other hand, extended deterrence involved preventing a Soviet conventional attack on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members (Mazarr, 2018). It is important to highlight that reinforcing extended deterrence requires taking steps to convince a potential aggressor that the distant defender will definitely respond to an attack, or at least as promptly as it can in accordance with national laws. Such steps include actions like stationing significant numbers of troops from the deterring state on the territory of the threatened nation, as the United States has done in many cases. The defender seeks to create the perception that it has, in effect, no choice but to respond if its ally is attacked. Yet this is a demanding standard to meet, in part because a state will seldom commit to anything like an automatic response if vital national interests are not at stake — and often, even if they are (Mazarr, 2018).^{9]}

Ultimately, the key for contemporary deterrence is in its broader version, such as extended deterrence (see Crawford, 2009, cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009), through the role of the Security Council; and the network of alliances of member states; in reference to the above stated assumptions, collective deterrence in international organizations (such as NATO) has to take into account the requirements of international law and the characteristics of any organization which is made up of different member states, interests and aspirations. The US, as we see in NATO, is facing significant challenges; therefore, the need to keep alliances viable and productive, through security maintenance missions. The US ambition deals with the strength of the American military options legality/legitimacy, and the creation of a strong Western military force (Morgan 2012, p. 99).

3.1 Implementing the extended deterrence in Greek-Turkish relations

For the Hellenic Republic (Greece) deterrence is a demanding issue, due to the geopolitical and geostrategic position of this European country in the area of Middle East. Greece confronts a series of contingencies judged high preventive priorities for policymakers, such as the Eurasia struggle, the intensification of the civil war in Syria resulting from increased external support for warring parties, including military intervention by outside powers. What is more, we also see political instability in EU countries stemming from the influx of refugees and migrants, with heightened civil unrest, isolated terrorist attacks, or violence against refugees and migrants (M. Zenko, 2015).

Considering all the above, we focus on Greek-Turkish relations as a case study in deterrence theory and practice. Due to many reasons,^[10] there are many constraints

9. The most famous cases of extended deterrence failure involving the United States — such as Korea in 1950 and Iraq-Kuwait in 1990 — can be partly traced to the fact that the United States was unwilling to demonstrate automaticity of response before the fact. Even the most powerful treaty commitments generally contain some degree of leeway.

10. As we see (Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Issues of Greek-Turkish Relations (2018) <https://www.mfa.gr/en/index.html>): “in the early 1970s, Turkey initiated a systematic policy of contentions and claims against the sovereignty, the sovereign rights and jurisdictions of Greece... The goal of this newly formed

on the establishment of a security regime between Greece and Turkey (Tsakonias 1991). As Tsakonias pointed out ‘at the systemic level, the main issue hindering the development of a security regime between Greece and Turkey is that of the legitimacy of external actors; more specifically, mainly the ability of the United States, as the sole systemic protagonist in the post-Cold War era, to act as an “honest broker” in the Greek-Turkish conflict’. We can see that the consequences of the existing and still deteriorating Greek-Turkish ‘security dilemma are reflecting on an arms build-up (ibid., 1991). We must not forget that ‘in the standard security dilemma, states cannot distinguish between the arms another state acquires to safeguard its defense and those it buys to perpetrate aggression. The security dilemma exists only when offensive and defensive postures and weapons are at least somewhat indistinguishable, and it is most intense and unstable when the offense has the advantage’ (Krebs 1999). Moreover ‘the anarchic structure of the international system as a whole and that of the regional international system in which Greece and Turkey are geographically embedded constitutes the primary political context for their national security’ (Y. A. Stivachtis, 2000). Thus, military power lies at the heart of the national security problem (ibid., 2000). ‘Force is an ineluctable element in international relations, not because of any inherent tendency on the part of man to use it, but due to the possibility of its use. It has thus to be deterred and controlled’ (Howard 1970, pp. 5, 11). Mainly, the argument that NATO membership would stabilize the region by filling the power vacuum and eliminating the need for security competition (Krebs 1999, p. 343–377) remains an open question.

In the course of this analysis, we may project the following fundamental assumption, according to which ‘small states, whether primarily revisionist or *status quo*, join alliances because they cannot attain their central values alone, and their success in achieving their aims depends less on their own capabilities than on the strength and credibility of their larger patrons. Greece and Turkey are engaged in a contest over Cyprus [and Aegean matters and in the Eastern Mediterranean], while alli-

policy against Greece has been the changing of the territorial *status quo* provided for in international treaties — the Treaty of Lausanne being pivotal among these — and the legal status of maritime zones and airspace as they derive from international law and the law of the sea. Starting with the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf (1973) and the crisis that followed — bringing the two countries into intense disagreement, which was taken in hand, on Greece’s initiative, by both the UN Security Council and the International Court in the Hague — Turkey started to implement the policy of constantly increasing contentions and claims, including: contesting Greece’s legal right, on threat of war (*casus belli*), to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles, as provided for by the Law of the Sea, and as has been done by virtually all coastal states in the international community, including Turkey (in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean); disputing the extent of Greek national airspace, through constant violations by Turkish fighter aircraft; contesting Greek regime and sovereignty over islands and violation of that sovereignty; disputing the delimitation of territorial sea; disputing responsibilities within the Athina FIR, which were entrusted to Greece by ICAO, and constant refusal on the part of Turkey to comply with air traffic regulations; disputing Greece’s jurisdiction within the search and rescue region under Greek responsibility; demanding the demilitarization of the islands of the Eastern Aegean. ...Greece stresses the need to respect International Law (in particular the International Law of the Sea) as well as the importance of the principle of good neighborly relations — an essential European common value”.

ance arms transfers helped transform this limited dispute into a broader and deeper enmity. The transparency of capabilities fostered by the alliance could hardly calm decision makers anxious about the other party's motives' (Y. A. Stivachtis, 2000). It is well-known that the contention between Greece and Turkey is deeply rooted in history and geography, and had the two countries remained outside the NATO alliance, their relations would no doubt have been punctuated by moments of discord (ibid). As Krebs assumed, 'the NATO alliance powerfully influenced the rivals indirectly, through the regular interaction of Greek and Turkish military officers, who gained greater understanding of their respective interests and perceptions. Their membership in the alliance provided the United States with a measure of influence over their behavior' (Y. A. Stivachtis, 2000, ibid).

In this context, deterrence may have the following dimensions: on the one hand, 'NATO members should adopt strict standards to prevent the region from becoming the new hot spot for arms traders'; NATO members should disburse military assistance in such a fashion as to equalize the rivals' capabilities' (Y. A. Stivachtis, 2000, ibid.).

The United States has traditionally played the role of mediator between the parties and has important economic and military leverage on both Turkey and Greece. For this reason, the Biden administration is expected to leverage the flowering of US-Greece relations to promote stability and strengthen its influence in the region. Therefore, setting clear boundaries on Turkey's expansionist agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean, as part of a roadmap to improve Turkey's relations with the EU, will have positive knock-on effects like calming tensions with EU members Greece and Cyprus.^[11]

Under these conditions, deterrence in Greek-Turkish relations may have its extended version. To draw an analogy to the US version of extended deterrence (do not forget that extending deterrence in a credible way, proved a more complicated proposition than deterring direct attack),^[12] in Greek-Turkish relations, on behalf of Greek interests and national grand strategy, Greece has to go forward to the following *sine qua non* strategic depiction of deterrence: the first level of Greek deterrence doctrine should insist in the ongoing strengthening of external factor intervention,^[13] (such

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11. Pagoulatos G. and Sokou Ka, "US-Greece relations in the Biden era: Why the road to rebuilding the transatlantic alliance runs through Athens", Atlantic Council (and ELIAMEP), 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-greece-relations-in-the-biden-era-why-the-road-to-rebuilding-the-transatlantic-alliance-runs-through-athens/>
 12. Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Steven Pifer, and Kenneth M Pollack Monday, "U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges" (2010), Foreign Policy at Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-nuclear-and-extended-deterrence-considerations-and-challenges/>, pp.1-69.
 13. Tsilikas S, "Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and Its Implications on Greek-Turkish Relations", Thesis (2001), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235148502_Greek_Military_Strategy_The_Doctrine_of_Deterrence_and_Its_Implications_on_Greek-Turkish_Relations, pp.1-103.

as U.S., UN, NATO, and EU). The second level of Greek deterrence should move on Greece's maintaining military capability, as 'self-deterrence' (including the possibility of first and second strike or response). We must not forget that the critical distinction between extended deterrence success and failure is whether the potential attacker decides to commit itself to the sustained use of military force to achieve its foreign policy objectives against the defender and protege. Thus, the limited use of force by the attacker is not a failure of immediate deterrence if the threats of the defender cause the attacker to step back from the escalation necessary to achieve its goals. Whether any force is used is not the dividing line between the success or failure of immediate deterrence since the critical question for the attacker is whether to take whatever steps are necessary militarily to achieve its goals or to try to settle for some form of a negotiated agreement.^{[14][15]} The key of this extended deterrence for Greece is to maintain this rough strategic parity between the two sides, through which Greek superior equipment and training would give the Greeks an edge in air and naval combat in the Aegean and in the Eastern Mediterranean (while superior numbers would give the Turks a clear-cut advantage on Cyprus).^[16]

According to the NATO doctrine, deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic bond.^[17] However, this article, which is arguably the strongest US commitment of extended deterrence, does not oblige parties to take an automatic response to aggression against any other ally. For this reason, it is necessary to enrich this article by the following provision according to which "member states do not fight each other". We know that: a "NATO decision" is the expression of the collective will of all 30 member countries since all decisions are taken by consensus and the most important players in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are the member countries themselves.^[18] For this reason, any state that satisfies the conditions for solidarity and

14. Huth Paul K, "Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War Chapter Title: Conceptualizing Deterrence" (1988), published by Yale University Press. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt211qwdk.6>, pp.27.

15. In this context, Greek armed forces were placed on alert, as Turkey announced plans for a seismic survey south and east of the Greek island of Kastellorizo from July 21-August 2. Regarding this serious situation see international actor's reaction: "The United States is aware that Turkey has issued a Navtex for research in disputed waters in the Eastern Mediterranean," the U.S. State Department said. "We urge Turkish authorities to halt any plans for operations and to avoid steps that raise tensions in the region." Germany's Maas also warned Turkey Tuesday that it needs to stop exploratory drilling for hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean if it wants to improve relations with the EU. "Regarding Turkey's drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, we have a very clear position — international law must be respected so progress in EU-Turkey relations is only possible if Ankara stops provocations in the Eastern Mediterranean," said Maas, who chairs regular meetings of EU foreign ministers under Germany's Council of the EU presidency.

16. Central Intelligence Agency, "A Contingency Study on a 'Greek-Turkish Military Confrontation'" (1983), Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/02: Washington, D.C.20505. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T01058R000202330002-5.pdf>, pp.1-11.

17. Brussels Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

18. <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>

the compliance with the international law can adopt this fundamental principle. What is more, this kind of compliance is the optimum test for the NATO 2030 agenda to strengthen the Alliance in terms of “Strategic Security Peace”.^[19] This above stated perspective is the *sine qua non* condition of stabilizing the Greece-Turkey relations.

In general terms, the dispute between Greece and Turkey is a complicated issue. Regime establishment’s perspective has a dual background: the neorealist, under the USA deterrence’s role and the pluralistic, under the deterrent power of international law (via the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice).

4. Conclusion

Part of the scientific community assumes that the deterrence doctrine had negative implications and devastating effects in international politics (McCWire 2006).^[20] Therefore, it has been widely criticized (Morgan 2009 cited Paul Wirtz, 2009). Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that the political and intellectual inertia that existed in the Cold War deterrence doctrine was difficult to change or to be eliminated, so its transformation remains an open issue.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the questions to be answered have to do with the use of (nuclear) weapons in modern times; the control of state aspirations, and the transition to another doctrine beyond the classical deterrence. However, it is obvious that in a constantly evolving strategic environment the concept of deterrence would not remain in the same context and position, like during the Cold War, in accordance with Schwarz’s idea. It is precisely the complex nature of the modern security environment that urgently requires the widening of our perceptual capacity with regard to the deterrence (2009, Knopf, 2009 cited Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009). In this context, extended deterrence remains an impertinent reality and we may see the following dimensions:

- Deterrence relationships exist between different types of international actors,
- Deterrence relationships are often characterized by significant structural asymmetries; and
- Credibility is based on careful cost calculation; and on the projection of a deterrence and persuasive threat (Wirtz, 2009, cited in Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009).^[21]

19. This term is an author’s work in progress to capture the multipolar security environment in parallel with the democratic peace theory (see: Placek K., “*The Democratic Peace Theory*” (2012), International Relations ISSN 2053-8626, <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/18/the-democratic-peace-theory/>, pp.1-10).

20. According to him those effects were peculiar to the prevailing circumstances or are inherent to the concept; and for this reason, he addresses the question of ‘stable deterrence’.

21. See also: Zagare, F., & Kilgour, D., “Perfect Deterrence” (2009), Cambridge Studies in International Relations, pp. I-Viii. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-414. This assumption compiles methodol-

The (unnecessarily restrictive) assumption that conflict is always the worst possible outcome needs to be discarded. It has not proven useful for developing logically consistent and empirically accurate theory.^[22] Clearly, classical deterrence theory constitutes the conventional wisdom regarding deterrence. Nonetheless, classical deterrence theory is extensively flawed. Extended deterrence's enrichment provides a logically consistent alternative to understand the dynamics of deterrence. For Greece, it remains a solution to its security dilemma and a feeling of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Therefore, in our multipolar world order, extended deterrence theory provides the most appropriate basis for further theoretical development, empirical testing, and application to policy.

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ogies from different currents of deterrence theory, that can be aspired to be an application model to states and nuclear or not conflicts.

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